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{
Kym Anderson, Betina Dimaranan, Tom Hertel, and
Will Martin*
Rapid industrialization in East Asia, particularly China, is raising questions about
who will feed the region in the next century and how Asia will be able to pay for
its food imports. The paper ®rst reviews existing food sector projections and then
takes an economy-wide perspective using projections to 2005, based on the global
CGE model known as GTAP. After showing the impact of implementing the
Uruguay Round, the paper explores several alternative scenarios. A slowdown in
farm productivity growth is shown to be costly to the world economy, as is slower
economic growth in China. Failure to honour Uruguay Round obligations to
open textile and clothing markets in OECD countries would reduce East Asia's
industrialization and thereby slow its net imports of food. On the other hand, the
trade reform that is likely to accompany China's (and hence Taiwan's) member-
ship of the World Trade Organization (WTO) adds 30 per cent to estimated
global gains from the Uruguay Round. Their WTO accession is projected to boost
exports of manufactures and strengthen food import demand by not only China
but also its densely populated neighbours with whom it trades intensively.
The 1995±96 season saw a dramatic rise in international grain prices and a
drop in per capita world grain stocks to near-record low levels. That,
together with concerns about the erosion of agriculture's resource base,
and in particular the projections by the Worldwatch Institute suggesting
massive grain imports by China in the twenty-®rst century, have called
into question the long-term prospects for the world food situation. By
contrast, a soon-to-be-published study by Mitchell, Ingco and Duncan
suggests grain will be abundantly available for the foreseeable future so
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The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 41:1, pp. 19±44long as investments in agricultural research are maintained. In between
these extremes is a study by the FAO. Which of these sets of projections is
most likely? What do they imply about food production, consumption, and
self-suciency levels in the Asia±Paci®c and elsewhere? Who would supply
China and other food-de®cit countries? How could the latter pay for their
food imports?
This paper brie¯y reviews answers to these questions in so far as they
are provided in available studies, and then provides a new set of projec-
tions for the next decade. The latter is based not on a sectoral model of
food markets, as in the available studies but, rather, on a global,
economy-wide model of national and international markets for all
products and regions. The advantages of our approach are many: it identi-
®es the sources of economic growth that cause the expected expansion in
the demand for and supply of food and other products; it ensures
countries can import only what they can pay for through exporting or
borrowing (leaving aside food aid); and it includes in the base scenario the
inter-sectoral structural changes that normally accompany economic devel-
opment. As well, this new set of projections incorporates the agricultural
and other results of the Uruguay Round to be implemented over the next
decade (`other' being as important for food markets as the Round's
agricultural agreement, as it turns out).
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database and model are
used to generate the new projections for the year 2005. The full model
divides the world economy up into 37 sectors (11 are agricultural or
processed food) and 30 countries or country groups (including the 16
major APEC economies). In order to keep the present analysis and pre-
sentation of results tractable, however, the database is aggregated up to
the level of 13 product groups and 15 regions.
Many of the inputs into models such as GTAP necessarily are subject to
considerable uncertainty. Hence much of the paper is devoted to exploring
dierent growth assumptions and alternative policy shocks. These include
slower growth in grain productivity world-wide, slower industrialization in
China, the entry of China and Taiwan into the World Trade Organization,
and the failure to fully abolish the bilateral quotas on textiles and clothing
trade as promised under the Uruguay Round. All of these scenarios are
shown to have important implications for Asia±Paci®c food markets. The
paper concludes by drawing out the trade and policy implications for
APEC countries and mentions brie¯y what could be expected additionally
from APEC economies moving towards their espoused goal of free trade
in the region by 2020.
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The simplest trends and projections to report are those based on World
Bank data, since they are in the summary form of real international prices.
Grilli and Yang (1988) suggest that throughout this century the price of
food relative to industrial products has been on a downward trend,
declining at about 0.5 per cent per year. Even when careful adjustments
are made for the rising quality of manufactures, the relative price of food
has not risen (Lipsey 1994). This is a remarkable achievement, implying
that the global capacity to supply food has grown slightly more rapidly
than global demand even though population and incomes have expanded,
diets have been upgraded, and resources have been withdrawn to support
dramatic expansion in the industrial and services sectors. Will this pattern
continue in the future? The latest projections by the World Bank (1996)
for staple food and manufactured goods prices suggest so, because its
projections for real food prices to 2005 are lower than those prevailing in
the ®rst half of the 1990s.
However, a recent book by Lester Brown (1995) created major headlines
by suggesting a very pessimistic food supply outlook. Speci®cally, Brown
focused on China and pointed to declines he expected in land and water
availability for grain production there, which led him to project China
needing more than 200 million metric tons of grain imports per year by
2030. That volume roughly equals the current volume of global interna-
tional trade in grain, and implies China would be relying on imports for as
much as half its grain consumption by then. Because he believes the rest of
the world is incapable of satisfying that demand growth, Brown expects
signi®cant upward pressure on international grain prices over the next few
decades. These projections are based on simple arithmetic rather than a
formal economic model, however. In particular, they take no account of
behavioural responses to the price changes that would occur should his
projections of supply and demand changes in China and elsewhere materi-
alize.
By contrast, a forthcoming book by Mitchell, Ingco and Duncan (1996)
argues that there is good reason to assume real prices of grains will
continue to decline. Using the econometric model of world grain markets
that was detailed in an earlier World Bank study (Mitchell and Ingco
1993), those authors project the real price of wheat and rice to decline by
almost a third and of maize by a ®fth between 1992 and 2010 (compared
with declines of about 40 per cent in the 1980s). This study accepts the
caution in Crosson and Anderson (1992) that the global quantity of
quality-adjusted cropland may be near its limits, not least because of the
distaste for further widespread deforestation. It none the less concludes
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tural research continues to deliver sizeable increases in food production.
Another food modelling exercise, undertaken by the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), uses a global model that includes not
only grain but also soybean and livestock product markets (Agcaoili and
Rosegrant 1995). That study projects declines in real prices in international
markets for all those products by 2010, some by as much as 15 per cent
compared with the late 1980s. The IFPRI projections are in most respects
very similar to those produced by the FAO using yet another model of
world agricultural markets (Alexandratos 1995).
All three studies project large increases in both production and
consumption of food in all parts of the tropics and in China, a large
increase in food trade volumes, but small changes in grain self-suciency
ratios to 2010. Taking the average of the three sets of projections, they
suggest developing countries as a group (including China) would be
importing around 180 MMT of grain from advanced industrial economies
in 2010, double the volume of the early 1990s. East Asia would account
for 25 per cent of that, and the Middle East/North Africa for about 40 per
cent. All three food modelling exercises take into account the concerns of
Lester Brown and others that farm land is being degraded, that it is being
lost to non-agricultural uses, and that there may be limits to the expansion
of irrigation (which rose from 11 per cent to 18 per cent of arable land
globally during the past 35 years).
None of these models includes non-agricultural sectors of the economies,
however. That means they do not have explicit constraints on a country's
resource use (no more than the aggregate available), on its spending (no
more than is earned plus borrowings) and on its imports (no more than is
earned from exports plus net in¯ows of ®nancial capital, which in turn
have to come from other similarly constrained countries). Furthermore,
the above studies have no direct means of ascertaining the impact of devel-
opments in the non-farm economy on trade in farm products. As we will
see below, the nature of non-food production and trade growth in the
Asia±Paci®c region can have important implications for trade in food
products.
2. Overview of the GTAP framework
In this paper we employ a modi®ed version of an applied general equilib-
rium model known as GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project ±- see Hertel
(1996), especially chapter 2). The GTAP model is a relatively standard,
multi-region model which is currently used by over 100 researchers in 30
countries on ®ve continents. The database builds on contributions from
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agencies represented on the GTAP advisory board.
With the exception of China, income elasticities of demand are drawn
from the FAO database, and are therefore comparable to those used in the
study by Alexandratos (1995). Non-food income elasticities of demand are
also required, due to the economy-wide nature of the model.
1 On the
supply side, dierences in relative rates of factor accumulation interact
with dierent sectoral factor intensities to drive changes in the sectoral
composition of output. The GTAP production system distinguishes sectors
by their intensities in four primary factors of production: agricultural land,
labour, physical capital, and human capital. Thus in a region where
physical capital-is accumulating rapidly, relative to other factors, we expect
the capital intensive sectors to expand at the expense of labour-intensive
sectors such as agriculture in East Asia. These `Rybczynski eects' are not
present in the partial equilibrium models reviewed above.
Unlike the agricultural commodity-oriented projections presented above,
the GTAP framework is built on a complete set of economic accounts for
each of the APEC and other economies, based on the year 1992. In par-
ticular, our model incorporates an exhaustive description of inter-industry
linkages. In addition to dierences in intermediate input intensities, import
intensities are also permitted to vary across uses. Since much of the farm
and food trade in the Asia±Paci®c region represents trade in intermediate
inputs, the distinction between sales to ®nal consumers and sales to other
®rms can be quite important.
Another important distinction between the framework used here and the
approach used in the partial equilibrium studies of food demand cited
above is the treatment of product dierentiation and inter-industry trade.
In the IFPRI, FAO and World Bank studies cited above, individual
products are assumed to be homogeneous and perfectly substitutable for
one another. An alternative approach, adopted in this study, involves
dierentiating each product by country of origin. This approach has the
advantage of permitting us to track bilateral trade, as opposed to simply
reporting net total trade.
Throughout the analysis, we have used the standard GTAP parameters
as documented in Hertel (1996, chapter 4), with two exceptions. First, we
have upgraded the income elasticities of demand for farm and food
1These are obtained from international cross-sectional studies conducted by Theil,
Chung, and Seale (1989). In the case of China, we obtain the income elasticities of demand
from Zhi and Kinsey (1994) and Fan, Wailes, and Cramer (1995). A complete listing of the
values used in the present study is provided in Anderson, Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin
(1996a, Appendix, table 1).
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Armington elasticities of substitution used to specify the extent to which
similar products from dierent countries substitute for one another. In his
analysis of changing trade shares in the Asia±Paci®c region over the
decade of the 1980s, Gehlhar (1994) found that the standard GTAP trade
elasticities were too small to accurately predict changes in trade shares
over this 10-year period. By doubling these parameters he obtained a
much better prediction of historical changes in export shares in the region.
Accordingly, we have used those doubled parameter values for the long-
term (13-year) projections reported below.
3. Base case projections in GTAP
The projections from 1992 to 2005 used in this paper are based on a
relatively small number of exogenous shocks. Speci®cally, we utilize
exogenous projections of each region's endowments of agricultural land,
physical capital, human capital, the state of technology, population and
the labour force. These are based on combinations of historical data and
World Bank projections of the growth in population, labour force, real
GDP, physical capital and human capital, with minor adjustments.
2
Physical capital stock projections were generated by adding investment in
each year and subtracting depreciation using the methodology of Nehru
and Dhareshwar (1994). The human capital projections were based on
projections of the growth in the stock of tertiary-educated labour in each
developing country (Ahuja and Filmer 1995) and historical growth rates in
developed countries to provide an indication of changes in the stock of
those quali®ed for employment as professional and technical workers. The
stock of agricultural land is held constant in the base case, but it is varied
in one of the subsequent scenarios. Base case estimates of non-agricultural,
neutral total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates for each region were
obtained by subtracting the growth in total factor inputs from the real,
non-agricultural GDP projections. Finally, instead of projecting
commodity-speci®c total factor productivity growth for agricultural
products, we calibrate our base case to IFPRI's world price projections
(Rosegrant, Agcaoili and Perez 1995, table 2) over this period and let TFP
growth for agricultural products adjust endogenously. Having ascertained
the rates of farm TFP growth implied by these projections, we then ®x
2In particular, the rate of non-agricultural total factor productivity growth was set at 3.0
per cent, consistent with the evidence provided by Jeerson, Rawski and Zheng (1995). For
a full tabulation of the projected factor supply and GDP growth rates for each economy,
see Anderson, Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin (1996a, table 3).
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rate for each farm industry is assumed to be the same across countries, an
assumption we intend to relax in subsequent work.
IFPRI's detailed agricultural commodity projections referenced above do
not re¯ect the ®nal results of the Uruguay Round agreement. Yet this
agreement has important implications for agriculture. We implement the
base case without the Uruguay Round ®rst, and then add the Uruguay
Round to establish our modi®ed base case. One advantage of this
approach is that it allows us to report information about the expected
impact of the Uruguay Round on world markets in 2005.
4. Analysis of the modi®ed base case (incorporating the Uruguay Round)
In order to see the eect of the Uruguay Round, we specify the associated
cuts in taris, tari equivalents of non-tari import restrictions, import
access commitments for rice, and export subsidies. The non-agricultural
information was obtained largely from the WTO's Integrated Data Base,
and the agricultural cuts are based on work conducted at the World Bank.
(For more details on the nature of these cuts, see Martin and Winters
1995.) Note that while these oers do not include protection cuts in China
and Taiwan (since they were not yet WTO members), in one of our
scenarios below we consider the implications of China joining the WTO.
(Otherwise we assume China's and Taiwan's policies are unchanged from
1992 to 2005.)
Table 1 summarizes the expected impact of the Uruguay Round on
average world prices, trade, and real income by the year 2005 (as
compared with the initial base case for 2005 if there were no Uruguay
Round). The combination of reduced export subsidies and improved
market access for farm products translates into higher prices, with the
largest increase being for wheat (more than 5 per cent). Nevertheless, these
increases are not enough to oset the structural decline in agricultural
prices built into the pre-Round base case. Therefore, our post-Round base
case still has agricultural prices declining, albeit by a lesser amount.
Average world prices of textile and wearing apparel products decline
considerably if the Round is fully implemented on schedule. This follows
from the removal of bilateral quotas on the export of these products
(except in the cases of China and Taiwan, which are assumed to continue
being subject to Voluntary Export Restraints until they accede to the
WTO).
As expected, the Uruguay Round also gives a signi®cant boost to world
trade in agricultural products. Table 1 shows rice exports being 147 per
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World Trade Trade Volume Welfare
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ
Commodity Price Volume Region Exports Imports % change US $
(1992 bill.)
Rice 2.1 147 China 2 2 0.2 2.1
Wheat 5.2 8 Indonesia 38 30 4.5 11.1
Coarse grains 2.3 32 Philippines 28 19 1.8 1.4
Other Crops 2.5 13 Thailand 23 18 2.8 6.5
Livestock prods 4.1 25 Malaysia 22 18 7.2 10.4
Processed food ±0.4 53 R. of Korea 23 20 1.7 9.5
Natural resource prods 0.7 0 Taiwan 3 4 0.9 3.5
Textiles ±2.7 29 HK/Singapore 2 1 ±0.3 ±0.5
Wearing apparel ±10.3 80 Japan 8 9 0.5 19.9
Other light man 0.6 6 Australia/NZ 8 8 0.4 1.9
Transport mach eq 0.5 6 NAFTA
a 7 8 0.4 31.8
Other heavy man 0.6 7 Western Europe 6 8 0.4 38.6
Services 0.7 4 Former Soviet Union 1 1 0.0 ±0.2
India 72 54 1.5 5.9
Rest of the World 17 15 0.7 21.1
WORLD 10 10 163.0
Note:
aIncludes Canada, Mexico and the United States.
Source: Authors' model results.cent higher and processed food exports being 53 per cent higher than they
would have been without the Round. Wheat exports increase by far less,
due to the trade-reducing eect of cutting export subsidies. Textile and
wearing apparel trade also increases signi®cantly with the removal of
bilateral quotas on exports into North America and Europe.
The second set of columns in table 1 reports the percentage changes in
regional exports and imports as a result of the Uruguay Round. These
increases are largest for the East Asian economies making the deepest cuts.
Asia also bene®ts greatly from the elimination of the Multi®bre Agreement
(MFA). Trade increases for the other major economies, but more
modestly.
Table 2 reports the projected change in composition of the world
economy over the period 1992±2005. Entries in each row refer to the
percentage change in the relative importance of each sector in the real
GDP of each region between 1992 and 2005. From the ®rst column, we
see that the projection suggests massive structural change in China over
the coming decade. The share of farm and food activity in GDP is
projected to decline rapidly (e.g. ±44 per cent for rice), in favour of growth
in the relative importance of manufacturing and services (e.g. 97 per cent
for transport machinery and equipment). The non-farm exceptions are
textiles and apparel. Due to their assumed exclusion from the Uruguay
Round, Chinese exporters of the latter products do not bene®t from elim-
Table 2 Cumulative percentage change in the composition of real GDP, 1992 to 2005 (modi®ed
base case incorporating the Uruguay Round)
China ASEAN-4
a NIEs
b Japan Aus/NZ NAFTA WEurope ROW
Rice ±44 ±29 ±39 ±22 ±9 3 ±14 ±16
Wheat ±54 ±33 ±50 ±41 2 15 ±31 ±11
Coarse grains ±46 ±24 ±79 ±57 0 1 ±27 ±20
Other crops ±42 ±28 ±37 ±9 ±7 13 ±13 ±9
Livestock prod ±33 ±34 ±32 ±34 2 ±2 ±14 ±2
Processed food ±31 8 5 ±13 ±11 ±7 ±15 ±7
Natural resource prods 18 ±38 ±1 23 ±2 1 ±2 ±2
Textiles ±16 95 29 ±9 ±29 ±27 ±27 7
Wearing apparel ±6 295 ±39 ±23 ±62 ±77 ±80 48
Other light man 30 ±17 15 ±0 ±11 ±5 ±7 ±0
Transport mach eq 97 ±12 2 1 ±8 6 8 ±19
Other heavy man 38 ±12 15 2 ±8 ±2 ±1 ±5
Services 14 ±0 ±0 0 2 0 2 2
Notes
aIncludes Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
bIncludes Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan.
Source: Authors' model results.
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The other Asian economies also shift resources away from agriculture,
although the ASEAN-4 and the NIEs become more competitive in
processed food production, due to cheaper agricultural imports in the
wake of Uruguay Round cuts. Overall, only Australia/New Zealand and
NAFTA see increases in the relative importance of agriculture in their
economies over this period, fuelled by the Uruguay Round liberalization in
other countries, and by generally higher rates of productivity growth in
agriculture relative to their non-agricultural sectors. For the world as a
whole, we expect the relative economic importance of farming to continue
to decline, as a consequence of the relatively low income elasticities of
demand for primary agricultural products together with continuing
relatively rapid farm productivity growth.
Table 2 also portends a continuing massive relocation of global produc-
tion of wearing apparel, and to a lesser extent textiles, from advanced
economies to the developing economies of Asia. Owing to its assumed
exclusion from the MFA reforms, China and Taiwan are not able to parti-
cipate in this accelerated growth in market access. Resources in that region
are therefore diverted to other manufacturing activities, particularly other
light manufacturing, transport equipment and machinery, and other heavy
manufacturing. Also, owing to China's WTO exclusion, the growth of the
textile and wearing apparel sectors in ASEAN-4 is extremely rapid.
Table 3 shows the eect of combining the production-side changes
enumerated in table 2 with consumption-side changes. Here, regional trade
balances are reported, by commodity. The ®nal column shows the dier-
ence between fob and cif values for merchandise commodities, while for
services it shows total exports of international trade and transport services.
Column sums give the change in trade balance for each individual region.
We have held each region's trade balance constant (by assumption) in
these projections, which is why the column sums are all zero.
The ®rst entry in the ®rst column of table 3 shows the dierence in the
grains trade balance in 2005 relative to 1992, in billions of constant (1992)
US dollars. At ±$4.9 billion, this indicates that China is expected to be a
signi®cant net importer of grain in 2005. When converted to physical
units, this amounts to imports (net of exports) of about 33 million metric
3In our earlier study of the Uruguay Round (Hertel, Martin, Yanagishima and
Dimaranan 1995) we assumed that Chinese quotas were eliminated. A comparison of the
two studies shows that this makes a big dierence in the pattern of expansion of the
Chinese economy over this period, and hence that this is a potentially large source of gain
from China acceding to the WTO (see below).
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(modi®ed base case incorporating the Uruguay Round)
China ASEAN-4 NIEs Japan Aus/NZ NAFTA WEurope ROW WORLD
a
Grains ±4.9 0.3 ±5.4 ±5.6 0.8 11.4 ±3.2 4.5 ±2.0
Other crops ±13.7 ±10.7 ±8.1 ±0.9 1.1 22.4 ±2.9 5.5 ±7.3
Livestock prod ±15.6 0.8 ±7.1 ±10.1 9.3 15.9 ±6.7 8.5 ±5.1
Processed food ±4.7 38.5 18.5 ±14.3 ±0.5 ±2.8 ±42.9 ±7.9 ±16.1
All food ±38.9 29.0 ±2.1 ±30.8 10.6 47.0 ±55.8 10.6 ±30.4
Natural Res prod ±4.5 ±7.8 ±57.7 ±23.9 11.4 ±5.8 ±28.5 102.5 ±14.3
Textiles ±11.6 ±29.4 40.8 4.1 ±1.1 ±4.5 ±17.7 5.8 ±13.6
Wearing apparel 19.5 128.4 2.7 ±15.3 ±2.5 ±71.2 ±93.8 14.6 ±17.7
Other light man 35.4 3.8 44.4 1.3 ±3.9 ±41.1 ±60.6 ±0.5 ±21.1
TMEq 5.3 ±57.2 ±39.0 24.8 ±10.8 0.9 124.0 ±91.7 ±43.7
Other Heavy man ±1.3 ±50.3 7.5 41.4 ±5.4 0.6 24.5 ±48.4 ±31.5
Services ±3.8 ±16.4 3.4 ±1.6 1.7 74.1 107.9 7.1 172.3
TOTAL
b 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes:
aRow totals for merchandise commodities equal the dierence between fob and cif value for services, the row total equals total trade and transport
service exports.
bColumn totals equal zero due to our assumption of a ®xed trade balance over the projection period.
Source: Authors' model results.tons. (China is 100 per cent self-sucient in grains in our initial database
for 1992 but drops to 96 per cent in 2005 under our modi®ed base case.)
Much more signi®cant are the increases in China's net imports of non-
grain crops ($13.7 billion) and meat products ($15.6 billion). Processed
food imports also increase more rapidly than exports in this period, under
the base case assumptions. Indeed, as the `All Food' row in table 3
indicates, China's net imports of all farm and food products are $39
billion higher in the year 2005 than in the base year of 1992. Grains
account for only 13 per cent of this increase in China's food trade de®cit.
China pays for this massive increase in farm and food imports by
expanding its net exports of manufactures. Here, a critical point relates to
China's potential entry to the WTO. As discussed in more detail below,
until that accession occurs, China is assumed to be excluded from the
liberalization of textiles and wearing apparel trade under the Uruguay
Round. This is why the combined trade balance on these product
categories in table 3 does not increase as in Asia's other developing
countries. Instead, the increase in Chinese net exports is concentrated in
other light manufactures.
Moving beyond China to the other columns in table 3, note that the
NIEs, Japan, and Western Europe all move into increased de®cits with
respect to grains and other crops. This is oset by increased net exports
from ASEAN-4, Australia/New Zealand, North America and the rest of
the world. With respect to processed food, which is a heterogeneous
category, we see negative net trade changes for Japan and Western Europe
and smaller ones for the other regions outside South-east Asia. In
ASEAN-4 and NIEs, cheaper raw materials, owing to Uruguay Round
tari cuts, result in a far more competitive food processing sector. In the
case of ASEAN-4, this eect dominates the negative numbers for primary
agriculture and the base case predicts that the value of total food exports
will increase much more rapidly than that of imports over this period.
However, the largest change of all for the ASEAN-4 region is the boost in
wearing apparel net exports ($128 billion more than in 1992), owing to the
abolition of quotas aecting clothing exports to North America and
Western Europe.
5. Alternative scenarios for the Asia±Paci®c region
The scenario presented above is a projection of the world economy based
on myriad assumptions. How does the projection change as these assump-
tions are altered? In this section we seek to identify and examine some of
the key forces shaping farm and food trade in the Asia±Paci®c region over
the next decade. We do so by exploring four alternative scenarios, each
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scenario involves slower technical change in agriculture globally, while the
others relate more speci®cally to China. In the ®rst of these we examine
the impact of slower industrial growth in China. The second involves
China and Taiwan's accession to the WTO. Finally, we consider the
impact of the failure to abolish the quotas on trade in textiles and wearing
apparel ±- a failure that is more likely should China join the WTO.
5.1 Scenario 1: slower technical change in agriculture globally
There has been considerable concern expressed recently to the eect that
productivity growth in agriculture may be diminishing. If the rapid
advances in agricultural productivity observed over the past 30 years have
re¯ected, in part, the adoption of a one-o improvement in technology
associated with the `green revolution', then it seems plausible that these
gains might be close to exhaustion, particularly in Asia where adoption
rates of these technologies are now very high in the areas to which they
are suited. Consistent with this, Crosson and Anderson (1992, p. 105)
conclude that future productivity growth must come primarily from the
generation of new knowledge, rather than from increased application of
existing techniques.
Clearly, reliance on new knowledge accentuates the importance of
maintaining high levels of research inputs. A wide range of studies has
found that there is a strong link between investments in agricultural
research and rapid agricultural productivity growth, and that such research
continues to have at the margin very high economic rates of return
(Alston, Craig and Pardey 1996). They have also shown that international
grain research in the tropics has very considerable spillover bene®ts to
temperate agriculture (Byerlee and Traxler 1996). Despite this, there is
considerable unease about the willingness of national and international
agencies to continue to provide the levels of support to agricultural
research and development that have been forthcoming in the past.
To explore the potential impact of reduced commitments to agricultural
research and development spending on food trade and prices, we evaluate
the impact of a decline in TFP in grain production world-wide of 0.5 of a
percentage point per year. This reduction represents about one-®fth of the
historical growth rate of agricultural productivity growth (Bernard and
Jones 1996) and it cumulates over the 13-year projection period to 6.7 per
cent less grain production.
The results from this adverse TFP shock for grains are reported in tables
4 to 6. From table 4 we see that there is a signi®cant eect on world grain
prices (a rise of 6.3 per cent for rice, 4.8 per cent for wheat and 5 per cent
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products in the year 2005 (percentage change)
Grain TFP China China and MFA
Slowdown Slowdown Taiwan in Snapback
WTO
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ
Commodity Prices Exports Prices Exports Prices Exports Prices Exports
Rice 6.3 ±0.3 ±2.6 ±0.4 0.1 0.7 ±1.6 0.8
Wheat 4.8 3.2 ±2.7 ±10.3 0.0 0.1 ±1.3 ±1.2
Coarse grains 5.0 1.9 ±5.0 ±0.8 0.5 1.1 ±1.3 ±0.3
Other Crops 0.3 ±0.3 ±2.7 ±5.8 0.1 2.4 ±1.4 ±2.3
Livestock Prods 0.5 0.3 ±1.5 ±7.7 0.3 11.6 ±0.9 ±1.8
Processed Food 0.3 ±0.4 ±0.4 ±0.1 0.1 3.7 ±0.9 0.8
NatRes ±0.1 ±0.1 0.1 ±0.4 0.4 1.0 ±0.8 0.0
Textiles 0.0 ±0.1 ±0.3 ±2.3 ±1.1 7.8 2.3 ±11.9
WearApp 0.0 ±0.1 ±0.2 ±0.3 ±2.6 8.6 11.0 ±30.7
OLightMnfc ±0.1 ±0.1 0.0 ±1.4 0.2 4.3 ±0.8 1.4
TMEq ±0.1 ±0.1 0.2 ±0.8 0.3 2.8 ±0.8 0.2
OHeavyMnfc ±0.1 ±0.1 0.1 ±1.2 0.3 1.5 ±0.8 ±0.2
Services ±0.1 ±0.1 0.0 ±1.3 0.3 2.6 ±0.7 ±1.4
Source: Authors' model results.
Table 5 Impact of alternative scenarios on regional export and import volumes, 2005
(percentage change)
Grain TFP China China and MFA
Slowdown Slowdown Taiwan in Snapback
WTO
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ
Region Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
WORLD ±0.1 ±0.1 ±1.2 ±1.2 3.0 3.0 ±2.0 ±2.0
China ±0.1 ±0.2 ±23.1 ±20.7 39.6 54.8 ±8.4 ±3.1
Indonesia ±0.2 ±0.3 0.1 0.0 ±5.9 ±9.0 ±19.7 ±15.8
Philippines 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 ±1.8 ±5.5 ±8.0 ±3.4
Thailand ±0.5 ±0.1 0.4 0.2 ±0.8 ±3.0 ±4.3 ±1.4
Malaysia 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 ±0.4 ±1.8 ±2.4 ±1.3
R. of Korea ±0.1 ±0.1 ±0.2 ±0.2 0.6 0.1 ±1.0 ±0.6
Taiwan 0.0 0.0 ±0.3 ±0.5 6.0 7.7 ±0.5 ±0.4
HK/Singapore 0.0 0.0 ±0.7 ±1.4 1.1 2.8 0.1 0.9
Japan 0.1 ±0.1 ±0.2 ±0.2 3.6 2.6 0.3 0.3
Australia/NZ ±0.1 0.1 ±0.5 ±1.2 0.8 ±0.1 ±0.1 ±0.2
NAFTA ±0.1 0.0 ±0.3 ±0.4 1.6 0.9 ±2.2 ±3.7
Western Europe ±0.1 ±0.1 ±0.1 ±0.1 1.6 1.0 ±1.6 ±3.2
Former Soviet
Union 0.0 ±0.2 ±0.7 ±0.8 2.5 1.1 0.2 0.2
India ±0.5 ±0.5 0.1 0.0 ±1.6 ±6.2 ±12.9 ±6.7
Rest of the World ±0.1 ±0.1 ±0.1 ±0.2 0.5 ±0.3 0.4 0.9
Source: Authors' model results.
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and livestock products and of processed food. As shown in table 5, the
trade impact of this scenario is very modest. The welfare consequences of
slower technical progress in grains are adverse, by de®nition. The world as
a whole would be worse o by $28 billion per year by 2005 if such a
slowdown were to occur (table 6, column 1). Due to its substantial export
position in grains, only Australia/New Zealand, among the country groups
shown, would bene®t more from the higher prices than they lose from the
assumed slowdown in their own grain productivity growth. Because the
slowdown is assumed to be global, it has little impact on grain self-
suciency ratios for the dierent country groups (Anderson, Dimaranan,
Hertel and Martin 1996a, table 16).
5.2 Scenario 2: China's industrial growth slows
One of the major uncertainties associated with our base case projections
pertains to the rate of Chinese GDP growth over this period. We have
assumed an annual growth rate of 7.8 per cent, or 6.9 per cent per capita.
Even though China has achieved and surpassed that rate of growth over
the past 15 years, the agriculturally focused projections studies cited above
have assumed slower growth rates. For example, Rosegrant, Agcaoili and
Table 6 Annual welfare eect (equivalent variation in income) from various scenarios, 2005
in billions of 1992 $US
Grain TFP China China and Taiwan MFA
Slowdown Slowdown in WTO Snapback
WORLD ±27.6 ±199.6 50.5 ±44.8
China ±6.5 ±184.3 42.1 5.5
Indonesia ±0.9 ±0.4 ±6.6 ±7.4
Philippines ±0.3 ±0.1 ±1.3 0.6
Thailand ±0.1 ±0.6 ±4.4 0.8
Malaysia ±0.4 ±0.1 ±2.2 ±0.8
R. of Korea ±1.6 ±0.6 ±0.2 0.8
Taiwan, China ±0.4 ±0.8 2.2 0.1
HK/Singapore 0.0 ±2.5 4.1 2.8
Japan ±2.9 ±2.5 6.0 1.5
Australia/NZ 0.1 ±1.3 0.0 0.0
North America ±2.1 ±2.1 5.9 ±28.5
Western Europe ±3.2 ±2.0 10.2 ±29.9
Former Soviet Union ±1.1 ±0.1 0.4 0.1
India ±2.1 ±0.3 ±4.2 0.1
Rest of the World ±6.0 ±1.9 ±1.7 9.5
Source: Authors' model results.
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cumulated over our 13-year projection period, the impact can be quite
substantial. In order to explore the implications of slower growth for
patterns of trade and production, we consider an alternative scenario in
which total factor productivity growth in the non-agricultural sectors is
slower. In the base case that TFP growth rate is 3 per cent per year. In
this alternative scenario, we set this equal to only 1 per cent, which in turn
lowers savings, investment, and hence capital stock accumulation (±1.4 per
cent per year) over this period. The combined eect amounts to a
slowdown in real GDP growth in China of 1.5 percentage points per year
(6.3 per cent instead of 7.8 per cent). Moreover, the decline in non-agricul-
tural productivity growth, relative to agricultural productivity growth,
reduces the ability of the non-agricultural sector to attract resources away
from agriculture.
The second set of columns in tables 4 to 6 reports the dierences in
world trade and welfare in the year 2005 that would result from such a
slowdown in China. From table 5 we can see that the eect on trade
volumes is concentrated in China itself and that the impact on export
volume from other regions is spread fairly evenly. On the import side,
Hong Kong/Singapore and Australia/New Zealand are more signi®cantly
aected, but the total changes are relatively small.
Looking at the impact of slower non-farm growth in China on interna-
tional commodity markets (table 4), it is clear that wheat, other crops and
meat/livestock products would experience sharp reductions in their global
trade. Ironically, China's industrial growth rate is more important for
world food markets than it is for non-farm sectors: slower non-farm
growth means less resources are attracted away from the Chinese country-
side.
An earlier and longer version of this paper reported the changes in
bilateral trade volumes for crops, meat and livestock products and
processed food (Anderson, Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin 1996a, table
13). The impacts of slower growth in China include a slowdown of crop
exports from NAFTA to China of $5.8 billion and of livestock products
from Australia/New Zealand of $3.8 billion per year by 2005.
Those countries competing with China in the global marketplace might
be expected to be pleased to see a slowdown in Chinese growth. However,
the results in table 6 indicate that economic welfare in all regions would be
reduced by slower growth in China. Hertel, Arndt, Hu and McDougall
(1996) have examined this phenomenon in considerable detail, and ®nd
that competitor regions, such as India and Indonesia, do indeed bene®t
from the changes in average world prices resulting from China's slower
growth, but those gains are more than oset by increases in the prices of
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demand for their exports to China. For the world as a whole, welfare is
estimated to be about $200 billion lower in 2005 under the lower growth
rate assumption in China. It would fall even more if China's slower
growth caused a growth slowdown in other regions as well.
5.3 Scenario 3: China and Taiwan enter the WTO
The oer that China has made in seeking entry to the WTO involves very
substantial top-down reductions in its protection rates (Bach, Martin and
Stevens 1996). Assuming that taris are cut only when the tari binding
oered to WTO is below the applied rate, the oer in 1995 involved a fall
in the weighted average nominal rate of protection in China to 16 per cent
(from 30 per cent in 1992). This reduction would be complemented by a
substantial reduction in the coverage of non-tari barriers. In this paper,
we have used the reductions in the trade-weighted bilateral taris as
documented in Bach (1995) to give us an indication of the impact of such
an oer.
4 Since China's accession to the WTO will be followed immedi-
ately by Taiwan's accession, we have combined these two events into one
scenario. We assume that Taiwan's non-agricultural taris would be cut by
36 per cent and its agricultural cuts would be only half as deep (18 per
cent). We also assume admission to the WTO will confer an additional
important bene®t on China (and Taiwan to a lesser degree) in the form of
increases in the growth rates of its quotas on textiles and clothing exports
to North America and Western Europe under the provisions of the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).
Based on such oers, there would be a substantial increase in China's
overall trade volume, with its imports in 2005 being 55 per cent greater
and exports 40 per cent greater (table 5). Imports of most industrial
products would rise substantially because of the large reductions in protec-
tion rates on these goods. Amongst the crops, by contrast, only very small
reductions in protection are being oered. Because of that, China's
imports of wheat and rice are projected to fall as consumers move towards
the goods whose domestic prices drop as substitutes. China's imports of
meats and processed foods, however, are projected to grow substantially.
The net eect of these changes on international prices and global trade is
4This speci®cation omits two important, but partially osetting, features of the situation.
The neglect of the current system of tari exemptions tends to overstate the impact. The
omission of NTB abolition tends to underestimate the eect. Dealing with the tari exemp-
tions will clearly change the speci®c results, but does not appear to change the broad
conclusions (Bach, Martin and Stevens 1996).
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most goods. The exceptions are textiles and clothing, whose prices would
fall by 1 per cent to 3 per cent as China expands its exports of these
labour-intensive manufactures in which it has a strong comparative
advantage.
Following WTO entry, China's exports of textiles and wearing apparel
would expand dramatically from the assumed growth in and then elimina-
tion of the MFA quotas on China's exports to North America and
Western Europe. This causes reductions in exports from China's most
direct competitors in these markets, namely ASEAN-4, where output falls.
Wearing apparel exports from ASEAN-4 are diverted from the MFA
markets of North America and Western Europe to the other high-income
markets of Japan and Australia/New Zealand. China's exports of agricul-
tural products as a group decrease substantially, and large increases in
export sales to China arise in processed food from the NIEs, NAFTA, and
Western Europe. NAFTA increases its exports of livestock products to
China by $6.8 billion, while Western Europe and the rest of the world
supply an added $3.4 billion of these products to China (Anderson,
Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin 1996a, table 14). These regions achieve
these increases in part by diverting exports from other destinations. This is
not the case with the ASEAN-4, which increases its total volume of farm
and food exports by almost $9.3 billion as a result of the assumed reforms
to accompany China's entry into the WTO.
Turning to the welfare results, table 6 shows that the trade liberalization
resulting from China and Taiwan joining the WTO increases world welfare
by a total of $50 billion per year in 2005. This ®gure represents a 30 per
cent boost to the real income gains from the Uruguay Round. The main
gainers from this boost are Western Europe, Japan, North America, and
Hong Kong/Singapore. The results suggest the other ASEAN countries
experience a combined loss of $14.5 billion, because of the expansion of
China's exports of textiles and clothing. But it should be recalled that this
result is based on the assumption that these economies do not grow any
faster with China's WTO accession. The results under alternative scenario
2 above (`China slows') suggest that even a small increase in China's
growth rate would bene®t ASEAN signi®cantly, probably more than
osetting the small projected loss reported in table 6.
One other caveat needs to be kept in mind. We have assumed in the
base case that China would not alter its policies between 1992 and 2005.
In fact, however, the projected decline in grain self-suciency over that
period might prompt China to raise domestic food prices above interna-
tional levels (Tyers and Anderson 1992, chapter 8; Anderson, Hayami et
al. 1996). Under such circumstances, acceding to the WTO, thereby
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ant than suggested by the above projection (which assumes no change to
current protection in the base scenario).
5.4 Scenario 4: incomplete textile and clothing liberalization
Commitments under the Uruguay Round to eliminate the bilateral quotas
associated with the MFA are designed to occur gradually. The ®rst step
involves increases in the growth rates of MFA quotas under the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing during the 10-year transition period
through to 2005, accompanied by a progressive integration of textile and
clothing items into the GATT system, at which point the quotas would be
abolished altogether. The tari lines to be integrated under GATT are
selected by the importing countries, and it appears that few commodities
subject to binding quotas will be integrated until near the end of the
transition period.
Our earlier analysis (Hertel, Martin, Yanagishima and Dimaranan 1995)
shows that the degree of quota acceleration under the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing is not sucient to reduce the quota rents for most
of the bilateral ¯ows. Therefore, we expect abolition of the quotas to
remain a contentious issue, especially if China joins the WTO and receives
expanded market access.
Failure to fully eliminate the trade-restricting eect of the MFA would
substantially reduce the export opportunities for the high-performing East
Asian economies, and hence their ability to ®nance imports such as
agricultural products from more advanced economies. Within East Asia,
failure to abolish the MFA would weaken the incentives to attract
resources away from agriculture and into industry. Thus, from the supply
side, this scenario can be expected to lead to a higher level of agricultural
output and reduced food imports in Asia.
We explore the quantitative implications of this scenario by permitting
the MFA quotas to `snapback' to the same level of restrictiveness (the
same quota rent per unit of sales) that was observed in our initial data set
for 1992. While this may seem extreme in light of the quota acceleration
built into the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, such is not the case.
Hertel, Martin, Yanagishima and Dimaranan (1995) ®nd that even if the
ATC quota growth rates are honoured, quota rents are expected to
increase over the period to 2005 for 37 of the 44 bilateral ¯ows examined.
Given that ®nding, our MFA snapback scenario may be more modest
than the true consequences of failing to abolish these quotas in 2005.
The results stemming from the MFA snapback scenario are reported in
the fourth set of columns in tables 3 to 6. (This snapback scenario assumes
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scenario is the very large reduction of world trade in textiles and wearing
apparel (12 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively ±- see table 4). This is
large enough to cause a two per cent contraction in total global trade
(table 5). The trade impact of this scenario is felt most severely by
Indonesia, India and the Philippines ±- countries which bene®ted signi®-
cantly from the removal of the quotas in our base case with China not in
the WTO. Since we have constrained regions to retain a ®xed trade
balance, this export reduction means that imports are also reduced.
Indeed, from table 4 we see that Indonesia's total imports fall by 16 per
cent, followed by India (±7 per cent) and the Philippines (±3 per cent).
These import reductions have important rami®cations for those regions
seeking to expand farm and food exports to Asia. For example, the
volume of NAFTA's exports to ASEAN-4 falls by $US 733 million for
crop products, $US 217 million for processed foods, and $US 47 million
for livestock products. Ironically, the reduction in ASEAN-4 exports of
textiles and wearing apparel is accompanied by higher levels of farm and
food exports ±- much of this to the MFA-importers. Food exports from
ASEAN-4 are $9.5 billion per year greater, re¯ecting the fact that when
the ASEAN-4 countries are stymied in one export market they move into
other ones. In practical terms, what this means is that the projected shift
of resources away from agriculture in our base case (table 2) will be
slowed if the MFA is less than fully reformed. As a result, the bilateral
balance in food trade (at constant prices) between NAFTA and ASEAN-4
deteriorates by a total of about $2.4 billion, relative to the 2005 base and
NAFTA's food exports are $5.6 billion lower per year in this scenario
(Anderson, Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin 1996a, table 15).
In short, by refusing to import additional textiles and wearing apparel
from East Asia, North America indirectly limits the ability of its farm and
food producers to export to Asia, and meanwhile indirectly stimulating
additional net food exports from that region.
In addition to limiting trade within the Asia±Paci®c region, the MFA
snapback is an adverse development for overall global welfare. The annual
global loss is equal to $45 billion in 1992 US dollars. Table 6 suggests that
not all regions lose from the MFA snapback scenario, however. Indeed,
the transfer of quota rents back to the restricted exporters is shown to be
bene®cial in many cases. However, the mechanisms for allocating these
quotas in many developing countries are highly inecient (Trela and
Whalley 1995), and some rent is dissipated in socially unproductive
lobbying, so those gains reported in the ®nal column of table 6 may be
illusory ±- particularly if incomplete reform slows income growth.
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Contrary to earlier studies and the fears of many food-importing devel-
oping countries, the global economy-wide model results presented in this
study suggest implementing the Uruguay Round will have very little
impact on real international food prices. Those prices are projected to be
only 2 to 4 per cent higher than they otherwise would be in a decade's
time ±- a rise that will be imperceptible compared with the usual year-to-
year ¯uctuations in food prices and foreign exchange rates.
There are two main reasons for this price eect being much smaller than
was anticipated earlier in the decade. One is that, on close inspection, the
agricultural commitments under the Round by the most farm protectionist
countries are far more modest than was hoped for. The other reason is
one that was not picked up by earlier studies that focus only on food
markets. It is that many markets for non-farm products also are to be
liberalized under the Uruguay Round. As a result, their prices will rise in
international markets as well. This moderates the increase in farm relative
to non-farm prices ±- and it is relative prices that in¯uence decisions of
producers and consumers.
This result is based on the assumption that farm productivity growth
continues at the relatively high rates of the past few decades. Such an
assumption may be too optimistic, however, given the slowdown in the
past decade (a) in funding for the international agricultural research that
generated rapid technological change in farming and (b) in irrigation devel-
opments. Our analysis shows that even a modest slowdown of about one-
®fth (half a percentage point per year) in the growth rate of grain total
factor productivity globally could have a sizeable impact on food prices.
Grain prices in international markets, for example, would be 5 per cent or
6 per cent higher than otherwise by the year 2005 (twice the estimated
shock to be expected from the Uruguay Round). While this may not
bother high-income countries much, it on top of the Round would be felt
keenly by low-income food-de®cit countries ±- especially if, as often
happens when grain prices rise, it were to be accompanied by less food
aid. The world economy would be $28 billion per year worse o from such
a grain productivity slowdown, suggesting the need to re-assess the
decision to redirect aid funds away from agricultural research.
The results suggest the accession of China (and hence Taiwan) to the
World Trade Organization could provide a very signi®cant boost to the
gains from the Uruguay Round. We have assumed that on accession (but
not otherwise) the advanced industrial countries would oer China and
Taiwan the same degree of expanding access to textile and clothing
markets as if China had been a GATT contracting party and had signed
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tional grain price rises due to the Round would be twice as large with
China participating, and the rise in livestock product prices would be 40
per cent greater. China in that case would import four per cent, instead of
just one per cent, of its grain needs by 2005. Aggregate world trade would
be 13 per cent instead of just 10 per cent greater thanks to the Round; and
the annual gain in global welfare by 2005 would be boosted by almost a
third as much again with China becoming a WTO member.
Furthermore, these results are lower-bound estimates, because they do
not include important dynamic eects of reform. Speci®cally, they ignore
the inducement to domestic and foreign investments that would
accompany trade liberalization. Should those investments boost China's
industrial productivity to the extent of causing its economy to grow 25 per
cent faster, for example, the gains from China's accession to WTO could
be as much as four times greater and its grain import dependence twice as
great (inferring from the opposite signs on the results presented in the
`China slows' scenario).
There is, however, a risk that advanced industrial countries will not
deliver all their promised reform to the MFA under the Uruguay Round's
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. That risk will be considerably larger
if/when China joins the WTO, given China's very considerable potential to
expand its textile and clothing exports over the next decade. Should there
be such backsliding on MFA reform, a great deal of the projected gains
from the Uruguay Round and from China's WTO accession would
evaporate, industrialization in Asia's dynamic economies would slow, and
the growth in East Asia's demand for food imports (and hence the rise in
world food prices) would be less.
While net food exporters such as North America and Australasia would
be harmed by such a slowdown in Asia's food import demand, might that
not be welcome news for poorer food-importing countries in Africa and
elsewhere? The answer is no, not least because that dampening of interna-
tional food prices would be a symptom of a slower-reforming and hence
slower-growing world economy, which would dampen development
prospects everywhere, including in Africa.
Clearly there is a commonality of interest between farm and food
producers in Australasia, North America and elsewhere, on the one hand,
and manufacturers in East Asia, on the other. The MFA, which restricts
imports of textiles and clothing into North America and Western Europe,
indirectly penalizes exports of food and agricultural products from OECD
countries. The failure to fully reform the MFA will ensure more labour
and capital remain in the agricultural sector in ASEAN-4, resulting in an
increase in net exports of food products from that region. Meanwhile,
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
Kym Anderson, Betina Dimaranan, Tom Hertel and Will Martin 40food exports from Australasia and NAFTA to ASEAN-4 are projected to
fall substantially if the MFA is not abolished. That is, trade is a two-way
street, and any delay in the removal of obstacles to textile exports from
Asia could well come back to haunt countries seeking to export farm
products to this region.
It turns out that none of these scenarios has much of an impact on grain
self-suciency ratios in 2005. Certainly there are some changes to be
expected between 1992 and 2005 as the Uruguay Round agreements are
implemented and as China's industrialization continues at a rapid pace.
But table 16 of our earlier paper (Anderson, Dimaranan, Hertel and
Martin 1996a) shows that those grain self-suciency ratios vary little with
the shocks considered, with one exception.
5 A clear implication is that the
ability of world grain markets to handle changes is not likely to be
threatened even by substantial shocks of the sort considered in this paper.
To conclude, mention should be made of one other potential develop-
ment that is likely to in¯uence Asia±Paci®c food markets signi®cantly
during the next decade or so. It is the Bogor Declaration of November
1994 by APEC Heads of Government, since rearmed at Osaka and Subic
Bay in the follow-up annual meetings. That declaration commits APEC
economies to move to MFN (non-discriminatory) free trade by 2010 in the
case of developed countries and 2020 in the case of developing countries.
Space limitations did not permit us to analyse this scenario in the present
paper, but we have since done so in a companion paper (Anderson,
Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin 1996b). In that analysis we assumed China
joins the WTO and examined the eect of all APEC economies liberalizing
trade beyond their Uruguay Round commitments to the extent of a
further 50 per cent tari cut by 2005. A key ®nding is that the results
depend very heavily on whether agriculture is included in the reform (as
demanded by the APEC food-exporting countries but contrary to what
APEC's North East Asian members want). Speci®cally, the welfare gains
from this regional liberalization when all goods markets are liberalized are
two-thirds greater than when agriculture is excluded. (Services trade liber-
alization was ignored for want of reliable estimates of services protection
rates.) If agriculture is included, this APEC reform would add one-third to
the global welfare gains discussed above from the reforms under the
Uruguay Round. It would also boost world trade in all products by an
5The exception is the case of slower growth in China. Consistent with earlier studies (e.g.,
Tyers and Anderson 1992, chapter 8), this is shown to cause China's grain self-suciency
to increase. The key reason is that projected livestock product demand growth slows, hence
there is less need for imported feedgrains. For more on how China will be fed in the
twenty-®rst century, see Anderson and Peng (1996).
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Uruguay Round plus the additional 4 per cent boost due to China's and
Taiwan's WTO accession). Agricultural trade would be only 2 per cent
greater by 2005 if farm products are excluded from the APEC reform, but
would be 18 per cent greater if included. What this clearly indicates is that
distortions to agricultural trade in the APEC region remain very large, and
that a further reform in the region that excludes farm products will be
missing a large part of the gains that remain to be reaped from trade liber-
alization.
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